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DIETRICK v. KEMPER INSURANCE
CO. - THE FIRST STEP TOWARD
LIMITING WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LIENS ON THIRD-
PARTY TORT RECOVERIES
In New York, a primary aim of both the Workers' Compensa-
tion Law' (hereinafter WCL) and the Comprehensive Motor Vehi-
cle Insurance Reparation Act" (hereinafter no-fault) is the com-
N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW §§ 1-157 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1990). The Workers' Com-
pensation Law was previously named the Workmen's Compensation Law. Id. The original
Workmen's Compensation Law was found to violate the due process clauses of both Fed-
eral and New York State constitutions because it deprived owners of property by imposing
liability on employers without regard to fault. See 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW, § 5.20 (1990). In 1913, a state constitutional amendment (N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 18)
was enacted to resolve due process problems in the original act, and the current version of
the WCL was put into effect. See New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 195-96
(1915). It has since been established that the only requirement of a compensation system
that has no regard to fault is that it is reasonable, meaning that the recovery is limited and
it goes directly to the designated employee. See, e.g., White, 243 U.S. at 201 (highly likely
that due process would be violated if all common law between employer and employee is
disregarded without reasonable substitute); Sweeting v. American Knife Co., 226 N.Y. 199,
201, 123 N.E. 82, 83 (1919) (burden placed on employees must be reasonable), affd, 250
U.S. 596 (1919).
The second attempt at creating a comprehensive WCL has withstood all constitutional
challenges against it in both the United States Supreme Court and New York Court of
Appeals. See White, 243 U.S. at 206-09 (system of compulsory compensation not offensive to
fourteenth amendment); Jensen v. Southern Pac. Co., 215 N.Y. 514, 523, 528-29, 109
N.E. 600, 602-04 (1915) (WCL held not to violate fourteenth amendment or state due
process clauses), reu'd on other grounds, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). See also I A. LARSON, WoRt-
MEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, §§ 5.20, 5.30 (1990) (history of WCL in United States and New
York State).
' N.Y. INS LAW §§ 5101-08 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990). See Comment, New York
Adopts No-Fault: A Summary and Analysis, 37 AL9. L. REV. 662, 664-65 (1973) [hereinafter
New York Adopts No-Fault]. "Prior to the recent trend toward no-fault systems of automo-
bile reparations, the law of negligence provided the basis of our automobile insurance sys-
tem." Id. The fault approach to reparations seemed to work well at a time when automo-
bile use was uncommon. Id. at 665-66. However, when automobiles became part of
everyday life, fault based systems were criticized as unreliable and leading to congestion in
the courts. Id. In 1974, the New York Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Insurance Repara-
tions Act went into effect, and although it does not contain a declaration of leglislative
purpose, it seems primarily to compensate victims for economic loss. Id. at 670-71. The Act
was generally opposed by the trial bar. See DiFede, Insurance Law, 30 SYRAcusE L. REV.
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pensation of injured parties' without regard to fault.' When an
313, 342 (1979). In 1975, the Act's constitutionality was challenged, but the New York
Court of Appeals held that it met all constitutional standards. See Montgomery v. Daniels,
38 N.Y.2d 41, 45, 340 N.E.2d 444, 446, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1975).
8 N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 5101-08 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990).
1 See Grello v. Daszykowski, 58 App. Div. 2d 412, 413, 397 N.Y.S.2d 396, 397 (2d Dep't
1977), rev'd on other grounds, 44 N.Y.2d 894, 379 N.E.2d 161, 407 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1978).
See also Kelly v. Sugarman, 12 N.Y.2d 298, 300, 189 N.E.2d 613, 615, 239 N.Y.S.2d 114,
117 (1963) (purpose of WCL was, in part, to protect employees and dependents); Fox v.
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 132 App. Div. 2d 17, 23, 521 N.Y.S.2d 442, 446 (2d Dep't 1987)
(no-fault insurance scheme adopted to ensure injured motorists receive full compensation
.,m- a, - .1 . ...., ,tu.p, .LC .1.1, MAluL. fULU. 111b. cu. v. Brook, 78 App. D.iv. id 456,
459, 435 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421-22 (4th Dep't 1981) (purpose of no-fault is not to give victim
windfall, but to compensate victim for lost earnings); Winfield v. New York Cent. & Hud-
son River R.R., 168 App. Div. 351, 353, 153 N.Y.S. 499, 500 (3d Dep't 1915) (WCL in-
tended to provide worker with state system of insurance), aJ'd, 216 N.Y. 284, 110 N.E.
614 (1915), rev'd on othr grounds, 244 U.S. 147 (1917); Skakandy v. State, 188 Misc. 214,
226, 66 N.Y.S.2d 99, 112 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1946) (purpose of WCL was to give workmen in
specified trades compensation for injury received in course of employment), affd, 274 App.
Div. 153, 80 N.Y.S.2d 849 (3d Dep't 1948), affd mnem., 298 N.Y. 886, 84 N.E.2d 804, 66
N.Y.S.2d 99 (1949); GovmNoa's BILL JAcKEr, L.1978, ch.572, BuDGr REPORT ON BIu.S,
S. 10275-B, at 1 (1978) (main objective of no-fault is that injured party be made whole for
economic loss); Brief for Appellant at 5, Dietrick v. Kemper Ins. Co., 76 N.Y.2d 248, 556
N.E.2d 1108, 557 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1990) (No. 90-137) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief) (intent
of both workers' compensation and no-fault was to provide quick economic relief without
regard to fault); Schreier, No Fault and its Relationship to WorkAmen's Compensation - The
Lien Problem, 50 N.Y. ST. B.A.J. 7, 7 (1978) (WCL's purpose is to provide benefits for
employees injured during course of employment).
Another purpose of the WCL and no-fault was to limit negligence suits against both
employers and automobile insurance carriers. See Cooper v. United States, 635 F. Supp.
1169, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). See also Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 218
(1917) (WCL was new remedy enacted for purpose of reducing expenses, uncertainties and
delays of litigations); Fallone v. Misericordia Hosp., 23 App. Div. 2d 222, 227, 259
N.Y.S.2d 947, 952 (1st Dep't 1965) (WCL assures not only certain compensation, but also
protects employers against excessive injury claims), afd, 17 N.Y.2d 648, 216 N.E.2d 594,
269 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1966); Gegan, The Compensation Carrier's Right to Restitution For Medical
Expenses Through A Lien On The Employee's Tort Recovey, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 395, 396
(1978). "From the very outset, one basic purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act was
to shift the cost of medical care from the employee to the employer who could better carry
and spread the economic risk attending industrial accidents." Id. WCL also reasonably dis-
tributes the burden of compensation payments over the affected businesses. See Jensen, 215
N.Y. at 519, 109 N.E. at 601. The intent of the legislature in enacting no-fault was to
lessen the cost of auto liability insurance, to increase benefits to victims, and to release the
courts of the excessive number of auto accident negligence suits. See Grello, 58 App. Div.
2d at 427, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 406. This goal may not have been achieved. See DiFede, supra
note 2, at 348 (although no-fault attempts to reduce insurance premiums, consumers are
paying higher premiums).
6 See Grello, 50 App. Div.2d at 414, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 397 (both WCL and no-fault are to
compensate without regard to fault). Compare N.Y. WORK. CoMp. LAW § 10 (McKinney
1965 & Supp. 1990) with N.Y. INs. LAW § 5104(a) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990).
N.Y. Woa. Comp. LAW § 10 states that "every employer subject to this chapter shall...
secure compensation to his employees and pay or provide compensation for their disability
or death from injury arising out of and in the course of the employment without regard to
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employee is injured in a work-related automobile accident, she
fault. ... Id.
Under the Workers' Compensation Law, an employer compensates an employee for the
employee's work-related injuries regardless of fault, except when: 1) the injury resulted
solely from the fact that the employee was intoxicated while on the job, or 2) the employee
intended to kill himself or another and was injured as a result, or 3) the injury was caused
by the employee's voluntary participation in a non-work related athletic activity. Id. Under
Workers' Compensation Law, damages for pain and suffering as well as punitive damages
are not available to the injured employee. Id.
N.Y. INs. LAw § 5104(a) states in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other law, in any action by or on behalf of a covered person
against another covered person for personal injuries arising out of negligence in the
use or operation of a motor vehicle in this state, there shall be no right of recovery
for non-economic loss, except in the case of a serious injury, or for basic economic
loss.
Id. Thus, § 5104(a), by excluding recoveries for basic economic loss based on negligence,
effectively mandates that such payments are to be made by the no-fault insurance carrier
without regard to fault. See id.
Under New York's no-fault statutes, victims of automobile accidents recover directly
from their own insurance company up to the amount of $50,000, representing "basic eco-
nomic loss" which includes: 1) necessary medical and treatment expenses, 2) lost earnings
from work based on 80% of lost earnings up to $1,000 per month with a maximum pay-
ment of $36,000 over a three year time period, and 3) all other reasonable or necessary
expenses incurred, limited to $25 per day for not more than one year from the accident
date. Id. at § 5102(a).
"First party benefits" are the payments made by the covered person's insurance company
to reimburse that person for basic economic loss on account of personal injury arising out
of the use or operation of the motor vehicle less: 1) 20% of lost earnings, and 2) amounts
recovered or recoverable on account of the injury under state or federal laws providing
social security, disability benefits, workers' compensation, or medicare payments (with ex-
ceptions to medicare), and 3) amounts deductible under the applicable insurance policy. Id.
at § 5102(b) (i.e., covered person has $500 deductible, and after she pays first $500, then
insurer starts to pay).
There are two limitations on tort recovery for personal injuries which are applicable
only to actions for covered persons. Id. at §§ 5102(c), (d). First, there is no duplicate tort
compensation for basic economic loss, because recoveries in third-party tort actions are for
economic losses above basic economic losses. Id. Second, damages for non-economic losses
(pain and suffering) are not recoverable in tort unless the plaintiff can establish that he or
she has suffered a serious injury, i.e. a "personal injury which results in death, dismember-
ment, a significant disfigurement, a fracture, loss of a fetus, (or the) permanent loss [or
limitation] of use of a body organ, member, function or system .. " Id. See also Naso v.
Lafata, 4 N.Y.2d 585, 589, 152 N.E.2d 59, 62, 176 N.Y.S.2d 622, 625 (1958) (under WCL§ 29(6), workers' compensation is exclusive remedy when employee is injured by negli-
gence of co-employee); Grello, 58 App. Div. 2d at 414, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 398 (Governor
Rockefeller, upon approval of New York's no-fault law, stated that it "assures that every
auto accident victim will be compensated for substantially all of his economic loss, promptly
and without regard to fault.") (quoting N.Y. Legis. Ann., 1973, at 298). WCL is designed
to shift risk of loss of earning capacity caused by industrial accidents to industry, and ulti-
mately, the consumer, regardless of fault. Id. See, e.g., 1 A. LARSON, WoRwEN's CoMPENSA-
TiON LAw § 2.00 (1990) (workers' compensation has different test of liability than torts -
work connection rather than fault); New York Adopts No-Fault, supra note 2, at 668 (no-fault
recovery is obtained without negligence suit).
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can simultaneouslye receive workers' compensation payments" and
no-fault payments, 8 which both compensate for basic economic
losses.' This fundamental purpose to compensate, however, was
subverted by conflicting provisions of the statutes."0 Workers'
' See Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Maiorano, 44 N.Y.2d 364, 372, 376 N.E.2d 1311, 1316,
405 N.Y.S.2d 666, 671 (1978). In Ryder, the court held that "the benefits under [no-fault
and workers' compensation] are at present independently available, except as expressly oth-
erwise provided in section [5102(b)] of the Insurance Law." Id. See also In re Allstate Ins.
Co., 81 App. Div. 2d 665, 666, 438 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (2d Dep't 1981) (employee injured
in automoDiie accident during course of empioyment is entitied to benefits under both no-
fault and workers' compensation); Carriers Ins. Co. v. Burakowski, 93 Misc. 2d 100, 102,
402 N.Y.S.2d 333, 334 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1978) (workers' compensation benefits are
deduction from, not bar to no-fault benefits such that employee injured in automobile re-
lated accident in course of employment is entitled to reimbursement of lost wages under
no-fault notwithstanding fact that she received workers' compensation benefits).
I N.Y. WOnK. Comp. LAW § 15 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1990). See supra note 5 (ex-
plaining workers' compensation statutory scheme).
' N.Y. INS. LAW § 5102(b)(2) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990). See supra note 5 (explain-
ing no-fault statutory scheme).
* N.Y. INS. LAW § 5102(a) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990). No-fault payments consist-
ently have been held to be equivalent to lost earnings. See Kurcsics v. Merchants Mut. Ins.
Co., 49 N.Y.2d 451, 458, 403 N.E.2d 159, 163, 426 N.Y.S.2d 454, 458 (1980) (§
5102(aX2) contemplates recovery for loss of earnings up to $1000 per month); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 78 App. Div. 2d 456, 459, 435 N.Y.S.2d 419, 422 (4th
Dep't 1981) (purpose of § 5102 was to compensate accident victims for earnings they
would have realized); Karmilowicz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 77 App. Div. 2d 131, 135, 432
N.Y.S.2d 698, 700 (1st Dep't 1980) (purpose of first-party benefits provision is to prevent
loss of earnings). Additionally, workers' compensation payments are equivalent to lost earn-
ings. See supra note 5 (explaining no-fault statutory scheme); infra notes 55-57 and accom-
panying text (discussing WCL payments' relation to lost earnings).
10 Compare N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAW § 29(1) (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1990) with N.Y.
INS. LAW § 5102(b)(2) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990). N.Y. WORK. CoMp. LAW § 29(1)
states in pertinent part:
If an employee entitled to compensation under this chapter be injured or killed by
the negligence or wrong of another not in the same employ ... .[take or intend to
take compensation, and medical benefits in the case of an employee, under this chap-
ter and desire to bring action against such other .. . [iln such case, the state insur-
ance fund, if compensation be payable therefrom, and otherwise the person, associa-
tion, corporation or insurance carrier liable for the payment of such compensation,
as the case may be, shall have a lien on the proceeds of any recovery from such
other, whether by judgment, settlement or otherwise ....
Id. It should be noted that the very nature of the workers' compensation system itself can
subvert the law's purposes. Under the WCL, employees relinquish their common law rem-
edy against employers and accept lower benefit levels along with greater assurances of re-
covery. See Note, Intentional Torts Under Workers' Compensation Statutes: A Blessing or a Bur-
den?, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 181, 181 (1983). Employers give up their common law defenses,
such as contributory negligence and assumption of risk, but are protected from unlimited
liability. See Love, Retaliatory Discharge for Filing a Workers' Compensation Claim: The Develop-
ment of a Modern Tort Action, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 551, 551 (1986).
Although Workers' Compensation was designed to help workers and to promote a safe
and injury free environment, it does have its drawbacks. See Ford, Who Will Compensate the
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compensation carriers were granted a lien on "any recovery" 11 re-
ceived by injured workers in third-party tort actions1 and, simul-
Victims of Asbestos - Related Diseases? Manville's Chapter 11 Fuels the Fire, 14 ENv'nL. L. 465,
469 (1984). First, workers' compensation hearings can go on for years and, as a result, the
system is overburdened. Id. Second, the injured employees often receive low payments and
hence bear some of the costs of the system. See Royce & Callahan, Isocynates: An Emerging
Toxic Tort, 18 Err.. L. 293, 305 (1988). Consequently, the pressure on employers to
maintain a safe and injury free environment may be lessened. See Note, Corporate Criminal
Liability for Workplace Hazards: A Viable Option for Enforcing Workplace Safety, 52 BROOKLYN
L. Rev. 183, 193 (1986). Finally, litigation has not been entirely eliminated by the workers'
compensation system. See Love, Actions for Nonphysical Harm: The Relationship Between tie
Tort System and No-Fault Compensation (With an Emphasis on Workers' Compensation), 73 CA-
us'. L. REV. 857, 868-69 (1985).
See N.Y. INs. LAw § 5102(bX2) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990) (allowing no-fault carriers
to deduct payments made by workers' compensation carriers). See also Granger v. Urda, 44
N.Y.2d 91, 99, 375 N.E.2d 380, 383, 404 N.Y.S.2d 319, 322 (1978) (coordination of no-
fault and workers' compensation poses problems not contemplated by legislature); Fellner
v. Country Wide Ins., 95 App. Div. 2d 106, 108, 466 N.Y.S.2d 766, 768 (3d Dep't 1983)
(having left § 29(1) lien unchanged by legislature after adoption of no-fault, harsh result
occurred); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 101 Misc. 2d 704, 710, 421 N.Y.S.2d
1010, 1014 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1979) (specific statutory deductions from no-fault
benefits not intended to reduce claimant's payment below actual economic loss), rev'd on
other grounds, 78 App. Div. 2d 456, 435 N.Y.S.2d 419 (4th Dep't 1981).
11 N.Y. WORK. Coup. LAw § 29(1) (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1990).
Is Id., construed in Fellner, 95 App. Div. 2d at 107, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 767 (when employee
elects to sue third-party for damages, workers' compensation carrier has lien on proceeds
of any recovery that encompasses compensation).
The purpose of § 29(1) in WCL was to avoid "double recovery by the claimant for the
same predicate injury by permitting the compensation carrier to recoup its compensation.
. .payments from the third-party tort-feasor by means of its section 29 lien on the claim-
ant's recovery in the third-party action .... " Granger, 44 N.Y.2d at 97-98, 375 N.E.2d at
382, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 321 (citations omitted). See Grello v. Daszykowski, 58 App. Div. 2d
412, 414, 397 N.Y.S.2d 396, 398 (2d Dep't 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 44 N.Y.2d 894,
379 N.E.2d 161, 407 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1978). The court noted that "a claimant's recovery in
a third-party action acknowledged the fact that third-party actions based on fault were in-
tended to compensate an injured party for his entire loss-both economic and
noneconomic." Id.
The statutory lien protected the workers' compensation carrier from having to pay eco-
nomic losses which the injured employee recovered from the negligent third-party. See id.
(equitable for compensation carrier to have lien, otherwise injured party would receive
double recovery); Amo v. Empsall-Clark Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 852, 853, 193 N.Y.S.2d 154,
157 (3d Dep't 1959) (primary purpose of compensation deduction is prevention of double
recovery to detriment of one who already made payment); Berenberg v. Park Memorial
Chapel, 286 App. Div. 167, 170, 142 N.Y.S.2d 345, 348 (3d Dep't 1955) (purpose of regu-
lating third-party claims was prevention of double recovery by injured workers and reim-
bursement to insurance carrier); Cardillo v. Long Island College Hosp., 86 Misc. 2d 438,
440, 382 N.Y.S.2d 642, 643 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1976) (statutory lien favoring workers'
compensation carrier regarding third-party recovery was meant to prevent double recov-
ery); Note, Work Comp. Law §29(1): Balancing the Equities in the Apportionment of Workers'
Compensation Litigation Costs-New York Adopts the Total Beft Doctrine, 58 ST. JoHN's L.
Rav. 676, 677 (1984) [hereinafter Balancing the equities] (employer or compensation carrier
is granted lien to prevent double recovery).
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taneously, automobile insurance carriers were permitted to deduct
the amount of workers' compensation payments from no-fault
"first party benefits.""3 In sum, the no-fault statute provided that
the no-fault carrier did not have to pay to the insured first-party
benefits to the extent that a workers' compensation award was
"recovered or recoverable." 4 In addition, it denied an insured
the opportunity to sue a third-party for basic economic losses.15
This result, coupled with a failure to limit the workers' compensa-
tion carriers' absolute lien, produced a "double debit," ' 6 whereby
losses comprising first-party benefits not paid due to the double
offset.' 7 This, in turn, left the injured worker with less than what
a jury had found was necessary to make her economically whole.' 8
In an attempt to remedy this problem, subdivision 1-a of section
IS N.Y. INs. LAW § 5102(b) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990).
Id. at § 5102(bX2).
' See supra note 5 (quoting N.Y. INS. LAW § 5104(a) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990)).
" Dietrick v. Kemper Ins. Co., 76 N.Y.2d 248, 252, 556 N.E.2d 1108, 1110, 557
N.Y.S.2d 301, 303 (1990).
" Granger v. Urda, 44 N.Y.2d 91, 99, 375 N.E.2d 380, 383, 404 N.Y.S.2d 319, 322
(1978). In Granger, the court concluded in pertinent part:
Thus, if both statutes are read literally a harsh, unintended result obtains. The no-
fault scheme provides that the no-fault carrier need not pay its insured first-party
benefits to the extent that a workmen's compensation award is recovered or recover-
able, while section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Law, by failing to limit the
applicability of the compensation carrier's lien on any recovery by a compensation
claimant in a third-party action, results in converting the injured employee into a
self-insurer for at least a portion of his basic economic loss. Manifestly, corrective
legislative action is advisable, if not imperative.
Id. (citations omitted). See, e.g., Vinson v. Berkowitz, 83 App. Div. 2d 531, 532, 441
N.Y.S.2d 460, 462 (1st Dep't 1981) (lien asserted by compensation carrier actually comes
out of injured employee's pocket); Grello v. Daszykowski, 58 App. Div. 2d 412, 428, 397
N.Y.S.2d 396, 407 (2d Dep't 1977) (shifting burden of basic economic losses onto victim
would be contrary to legislative intent and purpose of no-fault statute), rev'd on other
grounds, 44 N.Y.2d 894, 379 N.E.2d 161, 407 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1978). Cederman v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 58 App. Div. 2d 969, 970, 397 N.Y.S.2d 252, 253 (4th Dep't 1977) (§ 29(1)
caused injured covered person to "pay out of his permanent injury and pain and suffering
recovery his own first party benefits which presumably he has paid for in the first instance
by virtue of the insurance premium"); DiFede, supra note 2, at 344 (claimant made self-
insurer if he cannot recover basic economic loss from third-party and workers' compensa-
tion has lien on compensation awarded).
1s See Granger v. Urda, 54 App. Div. 2d 377, 380, 388 N.Y.S.2d 936, 938 (3d Dep't
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 44 N.Y.2d 91, 375 N.E.2d 380, 404 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1978). In
Granger, the appellate division asserted that it is unfair to deprive the injured party from
being made whole, as determined by a jury, and § 29(1) liens should not attach to third-
party recoveries because such recoveries equal damages which a workers' compensation
carrier never paid to a claimant. Id.
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29 of the WCL 19 was enacted to bar workers' compensation carri-
ers from obtaining a lien for compensation payments which were
"in lieu of first-party benefits.' 0 Notwithstanding the enactment
of WCL section 29(1-a), it remained unclear whether workers'
compensation payments for permanent partial disability21 and seri-
ous facial disfigurement 2  constituted basic economic loss and,
19 N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAw § 29(1-a) (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1990). Section 29(1-a)
states in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the state insurance fund, if
compensation and/or medical benefits be payable therefrom, or otherwise the per-
son, association, corporation, insurance carrier or statutory fund liable for the pay-
ment of such compensation and/or medical benefits shall not have a lien on the
proceeds of any recovery received pursuant to subsection (a) of section five thousand
one hundred four of the insurance law, whether by judgment, settlement or other-
wise for compensation and/or medical benefits paid which were in lieu of first party
benefits which another insurer would have otherwise been obligated to pay under
article fifty-one of the insurance law.
Id.
Id. See Fellner v. County Wide Ins., 95 App. Div. 2d 106, 108, 466 N.Y.S.2d 766, 768
(3d Dep't 1983). See also GovERNoR's BiLL JACKET, L.1978, ch.572, ASSEMBLY MEMORAN-
DUM, A. 12492, (1978). The Bill Jacket indicates that the general purpose of the bill to
amend § 29(1) was to ameliorate the problem recognized by the court of appeals in
Granger. Id. Furthermore, the legislature, the Insurance Department and the original spon-
sors of the no-fault law intended that no-fault victims not be subjected to a double offset.
Id. See generally Schacher, Third Party Action v. Carrier's Compensation - Lien and Offset, 36
BROOKLYN BAR. 138, 140 (1985) (principal basis for amendment of § 29(1) was fact that
carriers were permitted to benefit at claimant's expense).
31 N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAw § 15(3) (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1990). The statute defines
permanent partial disability as a "disability partial in character but permanent in quality
[where] the compensation shall be sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of the average
weekly wages and shall be paid to the employee for the period named in this subdivision..
. ." Id. The salary is multiplied by a percentage determined by the board and this figure is
multiplied by the weeks of lost earnings the injured worker has sustained. Id. It should be
noted that each type of injury which results in lost earnings has a predetermined maximum
number of weeks fixed by the statute. Id.
" Id. at § 15(3Xt). The statute states in pertinent part:
Disfigurement.
1) The board may award proper and equitable compensation for serious facial or
head disfigurement, not to exceed ten thousand dollars, including a disfigurement
continuous in length which is partially in the facial area and also extends into the
neck region as described in paragraph two hereof.
2) The board, if in its opinion the earning capacity of an employee has been or may
in the future be impaired, may award compensation for any serious disfigurement in
the region above the sterno clavicular articulations anterior to and including the
region of the sterno cleido mastoid muscles on either side, but no award under sub-
divisions one and two shall, in the aggregate, exceed ten thousand dollars.
3) Notwithstanding any other provision hereof, two or more serious disfigurements,
not continuous in length, resulting from the same injury, if partially in the facial
area and partially in the neck region as described in paragraph two hereof, shall be
deemed to be a facial disfigurement.
Id.
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consequently, whether a recovery for such injuries was in lieu of
first-party benefits.2' Recently, in Dietrick v. Kemper Insurance
Co.," the New York Court of Appeals held that workers' compen-
sation payments for permanent partial disability and serious facial
disfigurement are in lieu of first-party benefits and, therefore,
workers' compensation carriers do not possess liens for such pay-
ments against recoveries awarded in third-party tort actions."
In Dietrick, the plaintiff suffered fractures to her collarbone, ribs
and feet and a severe laceration of her forehead in an automobile
ment." Pursuant to a decision of the Workers' Compensation
Board,' defendant, the workers' compensation carrier of plain-
tiff's employer, paid the plaintiff for medical expenses, temporary
total disability,' permanent partial disability2' and serious facial
disfigurement." In addition, the plaintiff brought a negligence ac-
tion against the other motorist,"1 and settled with the other mo-
" See Dietrick v. Kemper Ins. Co., 145 App. Div. 2d 8, 10-11, 537 N.Y.S. 2d 372, 373
(4th Dep't 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 76 N.Y.2d 248, 556 N.E.2d 1108, 557 N.Y.S.2d
301 (1990). At the appellate level, judge Green observed that only one state court has
addressed the issue of whether or not workers' compensation payments for serious facial
disfigurement and permanent partial disability constitute first-party benefits. Id. (citing
Kupiec v. Christensen, 118 Misc. 2d 716, 461 N.Y.S.2d 175 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County
1983)). In Kupiec, the court held that workers' compensation carriers are not entitled to
liens for awards made to injured workers which constituted loss of earnings and medical
expenses, but were entitled to liens for awards paid for permanent partial disability and
serious facial disfigurement. Kupiec, 118 Misc. 2d at 718, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
U 76 N.Y.2d 248, 556 N.E.2d 1108, 557 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1990).
" Id. at 254, 556 N.E.2d at 1112, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
I ld. at 250, 556 N.E.2d at 1109, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
Id. See N.Y. Woas. Com'. LAw §§ 20, 23 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1990). Pursuant to
the cited provisions, once a claim for compensation arises, the workers' compensation
board shall consider all the relevant factors and make a final determination of payment. Id.
Additionally, if the claimant requests a review of the award it may be reviewed by the
Board and appealed to the appellate division. Id. See also New York Cent. R.R. v. White,
243 U.S. 188, 194 (1917). Workers' compensation commission's award is subject to appeal
on questions of law to the appellate division. Id.
s Dietrick v. Kemper Ins. Co, 76 N.Y.2d 248, 250, 556 N.E.2d 1108, 1109, 557
N.Y.S.2d 301, 302 (1990).
'Id.
I ld. Defendant paid benefits to plaintiff in the following amounts: medical expenses
$12,647.50, temporary total disability $3,150.27, permanent partial disability $11,460.75
(consisting of schedule loss awards), and serious facial disfigurement $5,000. Id.
,1 Id. See N.Y. INs. LAw § 5104(a) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990). Pursuant to §
5104(a), a seriously injured motorist can bring a suit in negligence against the other motor-
ist, but despite the ability to plead both economic and non-economic losses, he can only
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torist's insurance carrier.8 2 The defendant claimed a lien 3 against
the settlement amount to recover payments which it had made to
the plaintiff for permanent partial disability and serious facial dis-
figurement."s The plaintiff subsequently brought an action against
the defendant to remove the lien, claiming those payments consti-
tuted first-party benefits upon which no lien could exist.35
The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
ment, declaring that the defendant did not have a valid lien on
the proceeds of a third-party action to recover payments made to
the plaintiff by the defendant for permanent partial disability and
serious facial disfigurement.3 6 On appeal, the appellate division re-
versed holding that payments for permanent partial disability and
serious facial disfigurement were more similar to compensation
for pain and suffering.3 7 Reversing the appellate division and rein-
stating the judgment of the trial court, the court of appeals held
that the workers' compensation carrier did not have a valid lien
under the WCL section 29(1-a).ss The court stated that, pursuant
to the legislative intent behind this amendment, benefits paid to
the plaintiff for permanent partial disability and serious facial dis-
figurement are qualitatively similar to, and therefore, in lieu of
first-party benefits.3' The court further concluded that payments
for permanent partial disability and serious facial disfigurement
are tantamount to compensation for lost earnings because individ-
uals suffering from such injuries will experience a loss of immedi-
ate or future earning power. "
collect non-economic losses from the negligent motorist. Id.
I Dietrick v. Kemper Ins. Co., 145 App. Div. 2d 8, 9-10, 537 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (4th
Dep't 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 76 N.Y.2d 248, 556 N.E.2d 1108, 557 N.Y.S.2d 301
(1990). Even though the settlement between the other motorist and its insurance carrier
was only for the policy limit of $10,000, the defendant claimed a lien for $16,460.75 be-
cause it believed that plaintiff had retained counsel to recover additional funds in excess of
the policy limits. Id.
" Dietrick v. Kemper Ins. Co., 76 N.Y.2d at 250, 556 N.E.2d at 1109, 557 N.Y.S.2d at
302. See N.Y. WoRK. COMP. LAw § 29(1-a) (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1990).
' Dietrich, 76 N.Y.2d at 250, 556 N.E.2d at 1109, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
' Dietrich, 145 App. Div. 2d at 10, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 373.
-Id.
'Id.
'
5 Dietrich, 76 N.Y.2d at 252, 556 N.E.2d at 1110, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
-Id.
See id. (quoting Sweeting v. American Knife Co., 226 N.Y. 199, 201, 123 N.E. 82. 83,
aod, 250 U.S. 596 (1919)) (serious facial disfigurement has tendency to impair earning
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Writing for the court, Judge Bellacosa discussed the integration
of the no-fault and workers' compensation laws, and how this dual
statutory scheme interacted to produce detrimental results to
workers injured in automobile accidents.' Acknowledging that
the legislature, when it passed section 29(1-a), was trying to rectify
these seemingly incompatible provisions of the WCL and no-
fault,"' the court concluded that since both statutes seek to com-
pensate for lost earnings, workers' compensation awards should be
deemed equivalent to first-party benefits.'" Judge Bellacosa rea-
soned that if the legislature did not intend to treat all workers'
compensation awards as equivalent to first-party benefits, it would
have specifically delineated those types of awards that were not to
receive such treatment."" The court further stated that classifying
awards for permanent partial disability and serious facial disfigure-
ment as damages instead of first-party benefits would be contrary
to the whole theory behind workers' compensation awards: the re-
imbursement of employees for lost wages resulting from work re-
lated injuries.'
The dissent argued for the affirmance of the appellate division,
reasoning that the nature and character of payments for perma-
power of its victims). See also New York Cent. R.R. v. Bianc, 250 U.S. 596, 601 (1919)
(serious disfigurement of face or head may have direct correlation to injured persons earn-
ing capacity); Marhoffer v. Marhoffer, 220 N.Y. 543, 548, 116 N.E. 379, 380 (1917) (any
loss of physical function can potentially detract from injured's earning capacity); Wilkosz v.
Symington Gould Corp., 14 App. Div. 2d 408, 410, 221 N.Y.S.2d 209, 211 (3d Dep't
1961) ("[mloreover, in this State and in the Federal courts, it has been consistently held
that the purpose of a schedule award is to compensate the employee for immediate or
prospective loss of earnings or earning capacity"), aff d mer., 14 N.Y.2d 739, 199 N.E.2d
387, 250 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1964); Beekman v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 258 App. Div.
833, 833, 15 N.Y.S.2d 671, 672 (3d Dep't 1939) (loss of earning power should be basis of
award for disfigurement) (citing Sweeting v. American Knife Co., 226 N.Y. at 201, 123
N.E. at 83)). But see Clark v. Hayes, 207 App. Div. 560, 562, 202 N.Y.S. 453, 455 (3d Dep't
1924) (weight of authority and statutory construction indicate award for disfigurement can-
not be made in addition to permanent total disability), affd mea., 238 N.Y. 553, 144 N.E.
888 (1924).
41 See Dietrich, 76 N.Y.2d at 252, 556 N.E.2d at 1111, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
42 Id. See In re Butler, N.Y.L.J. at 1, col 1, Nov. 22, 1977 (Sup. Ct., Bronx County) (no-
fault and workers' compensation are not in harmony on lien issue, so workers' compensa-
tion lien should be vacated); Schreier, supra note 4, at 46 (no-fault statute and WCL statute
are not in harmony on lien issue).
a See Dietrih, 76 N.Y.2d at 252, 556 N.E.2d at 1111,557 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
" See id. at 253, 556 N.E.2d at 1111, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
See id. See also infra note 55 and accompanying text (analyzing theory of WCL).
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nent partial disability and serious facial disfigurement 6 are "more
akin to compensation for a claimant's pain and suffering and are
not first-party benefits for basic economic loss."4'7 In addition, the
dissent took the position that the express language of section
29(1-a) indicates the legislature's clear intention that certain pay-
ments made by workers' compensation carriers should not consti-
tute first-party benefits.48
This Comment will address how the New York Court of Ap-
peals correctly equated payments for permanent partial disability
and serious facial disfigurement with first-party benefits under no-
fault. It will explore the legislative policies underlying the crea-
tion of the WCL as well as those modifications of the WCL which
were enacted to integrate both statutory schemes. In addition, this
Comment will assert that the correct interpretation of lost earn-
ings, as defined within no-fault, was expanded to equate workers'
compensation benefits with first-party benefits. Finally, this Com-
ment will draw a legislative proposal in an attempt to clarify the
statutory schemes so as to eliminate future controversy over the
status of workers' compensation payments.
I. LOST EARNINGS AND FIRST-PARTY BENEFITS
A. Legislative Intent and Lost Earnings
At common law, when an employee was injured during the
course of employment, she could sue and allege that the employer
acted negligently.'9 The damages recovered, if any, would com-
" Dietrik, 76 N.Y.2d at 254-55, 556 N.E.2d at 1112, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
4' Dietrick v. Kemper Ins. Co., 145 App. Div. 2d 8, 11, 537 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (4th
Dep't 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 76 N.Y.2d 248, 556 N.E.2d 1108, 557 N.Y.S.2d 301
(1990).
" Dietrik, 76 N.Y.2d at 254-55, 556 N.E.2d at 1112, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 305. See also
supra note 19 (language of § 29(1.a)).
" See D. DoBs, R. KEErON & D. OwEx, PROSSER AND KE'TON ON ToRTs, § 80, at 568-69
(5th ed. 1984). At common law, the extent of employer liability was very limited. Id. The
common law theory of economics was that since the supply of work was unlimited and the
worker was under no obligation to enter into employment, the employee was expected to
accept all risks of the trade. Id. This left the employer with only a minimal obligation of
exercising reasonable care. Id. Numerous industrial accidents without any recovery re-
sulted because lack of care could not be proven, or the worker was held to have assumed
the risk. Id.
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pensate the employee for lost earnings and pain and suffering."
The WCL supplanted the common law, whereby the legislature
enacted a system guaranteeing compensation for lost earnings re-
gardless of fault.51 Since fault was no longer the basis upon which
a worker was compensated for injuries, recoveries for pain and
suffering were placed beyond the scope of the WCL. 2 Instead,
pain and suffering became "part of the risks of the employment"
as well as "part of [the] risks of the insurance.""
" See D. Doss, REMEDIES, DAMAGES - EQUITY - RESTITUTION, § 8.1, at 540 (1973).
Personal injury actions at common law comprise recoveries for lost earning capacity, medi-
cal expenses and pain and suffering. Id. Plaintiffs usually attempt to prove past and future
damages for each type of loss. Id. Although personal injury awards comprise lump-sum
payments, workers' compensation awards represent weekly or monthly distributions of ben-
efits. Id.
" See D. DoBas, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 80, at 572-73.
Statutory changes were being made throughout the country because of the large number
of industrial accidents remaining uncompensated under the common law. Id. See also Jen-
sen v. Southern Pac. Co., 215 N.Y. 514, 528, 109 N.E. 600, 604 (1915) (as industrial condi-
tions changed, there was need for more just and economical system of compensation for
employees in accidental injuries).
New York was the first state to enact a workers' compensation statute. See D. DOBBS, R.
KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 80, at 572-73. By 1921, the majority
of states had enacted such legislation. Id. Workers' compensation is a form of strict liability
because the employer is held liable for industrial accidents without regard to any negli-
gence. Id. Therefore, "the financial burden is lifted from the shoulders of the employee,
and placed upon the employer, who is expected to add it to his costs, and so transfer it to
the consumer." Id.
" See Sweeting v. American Knife. Co., 226 N.Y. 199, 201, 123 N.E. 82, 83, affd, 250
U.S. 596 (1919). Originally, under § 29, an injured employee was required to elect either
compensation or his common law tort remedy against a negligent third-party. See Calhoun
v. West End Brewing Co., 269 App. Div. 398, 400, 56 N.Y.S.2d 105, 107 (4th Dep't 1945).
In 1937, § 29 was amended to discard the absolute election of remedies, so that the em-
ployee could retain compensation and the right to take action against a third-party. See
GExAN, supra note 4, at 401. See also New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 200
(1915) (WCL sets aside common-law system regarding employer liability for employee inju-
ries); Cifolo v. General Elec. Co., 305 N.Y. 209, 213, 112 N.E.2d 197, 198 (citing N.Y.
WoRK. C6MP. LAW § 1011 (McKinney 1913)) (employer compliance with WCL excludes
any other common law remedy), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 874 (1953); Jensen, 215 N.Y. at 528,
109 N.E. at 604 (state competent to eliminate fault and causes of action for damages in
order to establish plan of compensation beneficial to general welfare); Fellner v. Country
Wide Ins., 95 App. Div. 2d 106, 107, 466 N.Y.S.2d 766, 767 (3d Dep't 1983) (under §
29(1), an injured employee may elect to sue third-party tort-feasor to pursue his common
law remedies); Morris v. Muldoon, 190 App. Div. 689, 692, 180 N.Y.S. 319, 321 (1st
Dep't) (if under WCL "there is a separate right of action at common law for the damages
sustained thereby, the Workers' Compensation Law would become a farce . . . however,
the right to recover for pain and suffering has been surrendered by the employe [sicl"),
affrd, 229 N.Y. 611, 129 N.E. 928, 173 N.Y.S. 905 (1920).
" Sweeting, 226 N.Y. at 201, 123 N.E. at 83. See also Jensen, 215 N.Y. at 527-28, 109
N.E. at 603 (at common law, servants assumed ordinary risks of employment, therefore no
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It is suggested that the fundamental policy behind the WCL is
to guarantee compensation for the inability to work in order to
insure that injured workers do not become a burden to society,"
rather than to award damages for the loss of a body function. 8
Furthermore, unlike recoveries in negligence suits against third-
parties which include non-economic loss, workers' compensation
benefits are based solely upon economic loss." Therefore, the ap-
unfairness resulted from enactment of WCL which provided limited compensation for acci-
dental injuries, whether or not cause of action could have existed at common law).
"See White, 243 U.S. at 197. The Court, upon reviewing the constitutionality of the
New York WCL, stated:
In support of the legislation, it is said . . .that under the present system the in-
jured workman is left to bear the greater part of industrial accident loss, which be-
cause of his limited income he is unable to sustain, so that he and those dependent
upon him are overcome by poverty and frequently become a burden upon public or
private charity ....
Id.
The Court further discussed the WCL's concern with the prevention of pauperism and
its relationship to vice and crime. Id. at 207. See also 1 A. LAasoN, WoRKUENs' CoMpEa.sA-
MON LAw, § 2.20 (1990). One of the underlying social philosophies behind workers' com-
pensation is to provide financial benefits to those injured in work related accidents in an
efficient manner. Id. This policy will relieve the community of such a burden and spread
the cost to the consumer of the product. Id.
" See Marhoffer v. Marhoffer, 220 N.Y. 543, 546, 116 N.E. 379, 379 (1917). judge
Pound, writing for the majority, maintained that "[tihe theory of the New York law is not
indemnity for loss of a member or physical impairment as such but compensation for disa-
bility to work made on the basis of average weekly wages." Id. See also Wilkosz v. Syming-
ton Gould Corp., 14 App. Div. 2d 408,410, 221 N.Y.S.2d 209, 211 (3d Dep't 1961) (whole
theory of WCL is to compensate for lost wages), affd mamn., 250 N.Y.2d 247, 199 N.E.2d
387 (1964); Sweeting, 226 N.Y. at 204, 123 N.E. at 83 (Pound, J., concurring) (if award for
disfigurement is based on impaired ability to get work, no injustice is done to act's pur-
pose); 1 A. LARsoN, WoRKMEN'S ComPzNsA'roN LAw, § 2.40 (1990) ("In [workers'] compen-
sation, unlike tort, the only injuries compensated for are those which produce disability
and thereby presumably affect earning power").
" See supra note 55; infra note 57 (equating workers' compensation benefits with lost
earnings, not damages recovered in third-party tort actions). See also White, 243 U.S. at
193. The Court maintained that "[c)ompensation under the [Workmen's Compensation
Act] is not regulated by the measure of damages applied in negligence suits, but.., it is
based solely on loss of earning power... whether partial or total, temporary or permanent
. .Id. See also Marhoffer, 220 N.Y. at 54748, 116 N.E. at 380. Judge Pound, writing
for the majority, observed:
While it may be urged that.., injuries are recognized by the [workers' compensa-
tion] law which do not necessarily impair earning power for any fixed period, such as
"serious facial or head disfigurement," . .. [§ 15 of the WCLJ ... refers to ...
compensation in case of disability .... (S)o far as compensation is allowed for inju-
ries which do not have any relation to disability for the full period for which such
compensation is allowed, such allowances are the anomalies and not the characteris-
tics of the statute. Any loss of physical function detracts potentially from earning
power, and the legislature is, therefore, justified in establishing a fixed period of
compensation based on a specific injury, such as the loss of a finger. If the injury
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pellate division's assertion in Dietrick that some workers' compen-
sation payments are non-economic in nature is incompatible with
the theory behind the WCL, namely to compensate an injured
worker for lost earnings."
The legislature's intent to view workers' compensation as com-
pensation for economic loss is further illustrated by the enactment
of section 29(1) of the WCL." This provision gives an injured vic-
tim the right to bring a cause of action against a negligent third-
upon the negligent third-party" and to maintain workers' com-
pensation payments as coverage for economic losses only." In ad-
detracts more or less from the earning power than the period fixed by the statute, it
may at least be said that the rule is simple and the scale of compensation definite.
Id. See also Sweeting, 226 N.Y. at 204, 123 N.E. at 84. Concurring, Judge Pound stated that
an extension of the theory of the WCL beyond the scope of impairment of earning power,
whereby an assessment of damages would be permitted, would introduce a new and diffi-
cult problem "as to the limits of legislative power . and the reasonableness of the bur-
den." Id.
" See Winfield v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 216 N.Y. 284, 289, 110 N.E.
614, 616 (1915) (compensation awarded to employee is representative of economic loss and
not like benefits received under rules of damages founded upon negligence), rev'd on other
grounds, 244 U.S. 147 (1917). See also Wilkosz v. Symington Gould Corp., 14 App. Div. 2d
408, 409-10, 221 N.Y.S.2d 209, 210-11 (3d Dep't 1961) (relying upon basic premise be-
hind WCL to state that there is no legal justification for theory that permanent partial
disability awards are not based on loss of earnings), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 739, 199 N.E.2d 387,
250 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1964); Appellant's Brief, supra note 4, at 9 (incompatible with theory of
WCL to permit workers' compensation carriers to assert liens on non-economic loss
recoveries).
" See N.Y. WoRK. Com. LAw § 29(1) (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1990). See also Mazar-
redo v. Levine, 274 App. Div. 122, 125, 80 N.Y.S.2d 237, 240 (1st Dep't 1948) (apparent
that under § 29(1) employer is immune from suit for damages); Lester v. Otis Elevator Co.,
169 App. Div. 613, 617, 155 N.Y.S. 524, 526-27 (1st Dep't 1915) (§ 29(1) relates only to
rights and remedies between employer and employee, but nowhere in provision is there
any attempt to alter remedies of employee against third-parties for damages).
N.Y. WORK. CoMP. LAw § 29(1) (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1990).
See Schacher, supra note 20, at 138 (under § 29, injured employee retains common
law right to recover damages from third-party action). See generally Woodward v. E. W.
Conklin & Son, 171 App. Div. 736. 739, 157 N.Y.S. 948, 950 (3d Dep't 1916) (primary
purpose of allowing employee to sue negligent third-party was to protect employee against
own ignorance in collecting claim for injuries); Application of Matzner, 96 Misc. 2d 198,
201, 408 N.Y.S.2d 762, 765 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1978) (purpose of § 29(1) is to pro-
tect injured worker, not carrier). Workers' compensation guarantees employees benefits
based upon calculated wages and relieves employers from uncertain tort liability. Balancing
the Equities, supra note 12, at 681. "When accidents occur, however, the statutory benefits
are meager and the rules strict. Public policy, therefore, is advanced by permitting, and
indeed encouraging, suits against negligent third parties to enable the employee to obtain a
recovery greater than the subsistence amounts provided by statute." Id. at 681-82.
" See Granger v. Urda, 44 N.Y.2d 91, 97, 375 N.E.2d 380, 382, 404 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321
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dition, section 29(1) gave workers' compensation carriers an abso-
lute lien on recoveries that workers obtained in third-party tort
actions.' In Granger v. Urda," the New York Court of Appeals
recognized that one of the considerations behind the creation of
the absolute lien under section 29(1) consisted of reducing the
cost of supplying workers' compensation insurance in order to
achieve the beneficial societal goal of creating a "workable system
of compensation,"" which would ensure that injured workers
would not become a burden to society. Nonetheless, the cost-sav-
ing goal behind the section 29(1) lien was extended too far and
the interaction between no-fault and the WCL created a double
debit for the injured worker." This "harsh, unintended result""
was minimized in Grello v. Daszykowski.67
In Grello, the court held that the no-fault offset for monies paid
by workers' compensation carriers was revoked once a lien against
a third-party recovery in a work-related automobile accident was
(1978). In Granger, the court, referring to third-party actions under workers' compensa-
tion, stated:
Where a compensation claimant is injured due to the fault of one not a fellow
employee, the Legislature has provided a means whereby the claimant may recover
damages to compensate him for the full extent of his injuries, a remedy not other-
wise available within the compensation system, by permitting him to prosecute a
third-party action against the party actually responsible for those injuries.
Id.
U See N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAw § 29(1) (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1990).
- 44 N.Y.2d 91, 375 N.E.2d 380, 404 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1978).
Id. at 97, 375 N.E.2d at 382, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 321. In Granger, the court elaborated
on the history of the WCL as follows:
It was also recognized.... that although funded primarily by means of employer
contributions, measures had to be taken which would ensure that the cost of provid-
ing this protection to injured employees did not escalate to the point of economic
impracticality. That this cost factor is of manifest concern to the Legislature is
evinced by section 18 of article I of the Constitution of the State which provides that
compensation payments "shall be held to be a proper charge in the cost of operating
the business of the employer." Moreover, in realizing that a workable system of
compensation could not totally redress an injured employee's injuries and remain a
financially viable institution at the same time, a decision was reached whereby a limi-
tation was placed on the amount of benefits recoverable by a compensation claimant.
Id. (citations omitted). See generally 1 A. LARsoN, WoRKMU's COMPFNSATION LAW, § 2.70
(1990) (compensation should not hurt employer as it helps workers because cost of system
is spread among consumers through higher cost of products).
e See supra notes 54 and 64 (explaining goal of WCL to provide limited compensation to
injured workers and spread cost to society).
" Granger v. Urda, 44 N.Y.2d 91, 99, 375 N.E.2d 380, 383, 404 N.Y.S.2d 319, 322
(1978).
e 44 N.Y.2d 894, 379 N.E.2d 161, 407 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1978).
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executed." The practical effect of this ruling was that, due to the
execution of the liens by compensation carriers, the no-fault car-
rier had to bear the loss69 and reimburse claimants for first-party
benefits that were previously withheld under the offset provi-
sion.' 0 After these two court of appeals decisions, the New York
legislature enacted section 29(1-a) and limited the scope of the
section 29(1) lien." The issue then arose as to whether all pay-
ments under the WCL were equivalent to first-party benefits and,
S~ ~~- -,rnmr~priatinn within the definition of basic economic
loss.7" It is suggested that the enactment of section 29(1-a) better
integrated the two statutory schemes and accomplished two basic
results.
First, the burden of compensating workers injured in work re-
lated automobile accidents for first-party benefits was effectively
shifted to the workers' compensation carriers. 73 It is submitted
" See Grello, 44 N.Y.2d at 896, 379 N.E.2d at 162, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 634. See also Mora v.
Ortiz, 75 App. Div. 2d 563, 564, 427 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417 (1st Dep't 1980) (court cites Grello
as standing for proposition that no-fault carrier must bear loss if compensation carrier exe-
cutes lien because offset is no longer equivalent to amounts recovered or recoverable under
WCL); Orth v. Coffey, 70 App. Div. 2d 614, 614-15, 416 N.Y.S.2d 324, 324-25 (2d Dep't
1970) (Prior to enactment of § 29(1-a), Grello stood for proposition that "compensation
carrier's 'absolute lien' [was] not affected by the fact that the no-fault carrier must reim-
burse the injured party to the extent of the lien recovered by the workers' compensation
carrier .... .).
I Grello v. Daszykowski, 44 N.Y.2d 894, 895, 379 N.E.2d 161, 162, 404 N.Y.S.2d 633,
634 (1978).
11 See Mora, 75 App. Div. 2d at 564, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 417 (under § 29(1), workers' com-
pensation carrier may attach lien on proceeds of third-party settlement; worker can then
proceed against no-fault insurer for first-party benefits for amount settlement was de-
pleted); Orth, 70 App. Div. 2d at 614-15, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 324-25 (absolute lien of workers'
compensation not affected by no-fault carrier's reimbursement for amount recouped by
workers' compensation lien).
'1 See Granger v. Urda, 44 N.Y.2d 91, 375 N.E.2d 380, 404 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1978) (de-
cided March 28, 1978); Grello v. Daszykowski, 44 N.Y.2d 894, 379 N.E.2d 161, 404
N.Y.S.2d 633 (1978) (decided June 6, 1978). Section 29 of the WCL was subsequently
amended by the addition of § 29(1-a) in August of 1978. See N.Y. WoR. Coup'. LAw §§
29(1) & (I-a) (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1990); GovERNoR's BL. JACKEr, SzNAT REP ORT S.
10275-B passin (1978).
" See Granger, 44 N.Y.2d at 98, 375 N.E. at 382, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 322. The court noted
that "events not foreseen at the time section 29 was enacted in 1937, have injected an air
of uncertainty into an otherwise smoothly operating procedure." Id. See also, Schreier,
supra note 4, at 8. Since the enactment of no-fault in 1974, the compelling question is
whether a workers' compensation carrier has any lien on the proceeds of an automobile
case, and to what extent. Id.
" See Grello v. Daszykowski, 58 App. Div. 2d 412, 415, 397 N.Y.S.2d 396, 398 (2d
Dep't 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 44 N.Y.2d 894, 379 N.E.2d 161, 407 N.Y.S.2d 633
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that shifting the cost burden reflects a fundamental change in the
political landscape whereby the legislature is no longer focused on
the previous policy of reducing costs to the workers' compensa-
tion system at the expense of the workers.74 Therefore, unlike the
legislature's original concern with the financial viability of the
workers' compensation system when the WCL was first enacted,7 5
the legislature must have felt that the workers' compensation sys-
tem was strong enough to bear the additional costs of fully com-
pensating injured workers to make them whole.76 It is also sug-
gested that when the legislature made workers' compensation
carriers primarily responsible for first-party benefits, it intended
workers' compensation awards to cover the same losses as no-fault
(1978). The court stated that Insurance Law § 671(2) (now § 5102(b)) allowed no-fault
carriers to deduct amounts recovered or recoverable from workers' compensation. Id. Sub-
sequently, the legislature made workers' compensation carriers the primary carrier for ba-
sic economic loss. Id. Therefore, under the terms of § 29(1-a), workers injured in work-
related automobile accidents may not elect between either the workers' compensation or
no-fault carrier as to which will compensate for basic economic loss. Id. In Carlo Service
Corp. v. Rachmani, 64 App. Div. 2d 579, 579, 407 N.Y.S.2d 700, 701 (1st Dep't 1978), the
claimant was injured in the course of employment as a taxicab driver. Id. He did not bring
a workers' compensation claim, but made a claim for medical expenses and lost wages
under no-fault. Id. The court held that an injured party cannot elect to seek no-fault bene-
fits rather than workers' compensation benefits. Id. See also 2A, A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW, § 71.24(b) (1990). In New York, an employee cannot merely by-pass
his compensation rights and rely exclusively on no-fault benefits. Id.
'" See N.Y. WORK. COmp. LAW § 29(1-a) (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1990) (limiting lien on
third-party tort recoveries for payments made in lieu of first-party benefits).
When § 29(1-a) was enacted, no-fault carriers could still offset first-party benefits by the
amount paid by compensation carriers in lieu of first-party benefits. N.Y. INS. LAw §
5102(bX2) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990). The compensation carriers, however, were no
longer able to execute liens on payments they made in lieu of first-party benefits due to the
limitation imposed by § 29 (1-a). N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAw § 29(1-a) (McKinney 1965 &
Supp. 1990).
This solution enacted by the legislature differed from the holding in Grello. See Grello, 44
N.Y.2d at 896, 379 N.E.2d at 162, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 634 (no-fault carrier bears loss if work-
ers' compensation carrier executes lien). See also GovERNoR's BILL JAcKEr, L. 1978, ch. 572,
BUDGr REPORT ON BILLS, S. 10275-B, at 4 (1978). The budget report stated that due to
limitations placed on workers' compensation carriers by modification of § 29, "compensa-
tion carriers would be unable to seek recovery of all compensation . . . paid to injured
employees in no-fault accidents," thus increasing the cost of maintaining the workers' com-
pensation system. Id. See generally GoVERNOR'S BILL JACKET, L.1978, ch.572, WOfKMs'S
COMPENSATION BOARD LrrrR OF JULY 13, 1978, A. 10275-B, at 1 (1978) (letter noted that
codification of holding in Granger would "involve a loss of monies to the compensation
carriers and could result in some increase in premiums").
" See supra notes 54 and 64 (explaining legislative intent to minimize costs of workers'
compensation system).
" See supra note 73-74 (demonstrating legislative intent, upon enactment of § 29(1-a), to
make workers' compensation carriers bear additional costs).
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i.e., basic economic losses; otherwise there would be no need for
the no-fault deduction. 7 One New York court, examining the leg-
islative history of both no-fault and the WCL, concluded that
workers' compensation payments must be equivalent to first-party
benefits because the two forms of benefits are interchangeably de-
finable as first-party benefits .7
Second, the legislature's solution differed from the result in
Grello in that it eliminated the financial liability of the no-fault
carriers of some. if not all. of the burden to pay for first-party
benefits. 71 Now, under section 29(1-a), no-fault carriers will only
pay first-party benefits when the benefits under workers' compen-
sation fall short of the maximum amount allowable as first-party
benefits.80
Given the foregoing, it is submitted that the legislature's intent
was not only to make workers' compensation carriers primarily re-
See Granger v. Urda, 44 N.Y.2d 91, 98, 375 N.E.2d 380, 382, 404 N.Y.S.2d 319, 322
(1978). The court, citing the Governor's Memorandum of Approval, N.Y. Legis. Ann.,
1973, at 298, observed that "there now exists a new insurance reparations system
which-assures that every auto accident victim will be compensated for substantially all of
his [basic] economic loss, promptly and without regard to fault." Id. See, e.g., State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 78 App. Div. 2d 456, 458, 435 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421 (4th Dep't
1981) (no-fault enacted primarily to assure that auto victims are compensated for economic
loss); Grelo, 58 App. Div. 2d at 413, 397, N.Y.S.2d at 397 (both WCL and no-fault are
concerned with compensating injured party).
" See Fox v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 132 App. Div. 2d 17, 23, 521 N.Y.S.2d 442, 446 (2d
Dep't 1987). In Fox, the court asserted that:
The fact that workers' compensation benefits were considered by the Legislature
to be interchangeable with first-party benefits, is exemplified by Insurance Law §
5102(b)(2), which provides, in pertinent part, that amounts "recovered or recover-
able" as workers' compensation shall be offset against the amount of first-party bene-
fits which a no-fault carrier would otherwise be obligated to pay. Thus, since the no-
fault carrier need not pay its insured first-party benefits to the extent that a workers'
compensation award is recovered and since the no-fault scheme expressly authorizes
such a deduction, there can be little doubt that these forms of benefits were in-
tended to cover the same loss, to wit, basic economic loss.
Id.
"' See supra note 74 (explaining different solution behind enactment of § 29(1-a) than
what court in Grelo held).
" See N.Y. INs. LAw § 5102(bX2) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990). It should be noted
that under the express language of § 5102(bX2), the no-fault carrier has an offset only for
the exact amount of benefits paid by the workers' compensation carrier which were in lieu
of first-party benefits. Id. It is therefore possible that workers' compensation benefits will
be less than the full amount of first-party benefits that an injured worker is entitled to
recover. See id. Thus, the no-fault carrier may still pay for that amount of first-party bene-
fits above the portion already paid by the workers' compensation carriers. Id. However,
workers' compensation carriers are still the primary source of first-party benefits. Id.
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sponsible for the payment of first-party benefits, but more impor-
tantly, to limit the lien in order to preserve third-party tort recov-
eries for pain and suffering81 at the expense of the workers'
compensation carriers." The court in Dietrick, equating payments
for serious facial disfigurement and permanent partial disability
with first-party benefits, recognized this legislative intent by not
allowing a workers' compensation carrier's lien on third-party re-
coveries for such payments.
Notwithstanding the absence of an express legislative statement
as to whether recoveries for permanent partial disability and seri-
61 See GovEaNoa's BiLLJACKrr, L.1978, c.572, BUDGET REPORT ON Bus, S.10275-B, at 3
(1978). The Budget Report addressed this issue by giving an example as to how § 29(1-a)
should function. The example assumes that a worker has sustained and received $32,000 of
basic economic loss from the no-fault carrier in a work-related automobile accident,
$21,500 of compensation benefits, and a general damage award totalling $60,000 at trial.
Id. The example then discusses the effect § 29 (1-a) will have as follows:
Upon an award in his favor of $60,000, the court reduces the amount by $32,000
pursuant to [N.Y. INs. LAw § 5104 for the amount of basic economic loss] for a final
judgment of $28,000. After the final judgment is issued, the claimants [sic] compen-
sation carrier attaches a lien against the judgment for compensation benefits paid
pursuant to Section 29 of the Workers' Compensation Law of $21,500, reducing the
amount paid the claimant to $6,500. Thus, under current provisions of the law, the
claimant would receive a sum of $32,500 ($26,000 in compensation benefits, and
$6,500 for pain and suffering) whereas under this bill he would receive $54,000
($26,000 for compensation and $28,000 for pain and suffering).
Id.
Given the above, two observations should be made. First, where general damages are
awarded, the amount of money paid above the basic economic loss is, per s, considered by
the legislature to be money paid for pain and suffering. Id. See also Gre/lo, 58 App. Div. 2d
at 416, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 399 ("traditional tort concepts remain viable only where the in-
jured party sustains 'economic' losses in excess at or of longer duration than 'basic eco-
nomic loss' or where a 'serious' injury has been sustained"). Therefore, the above example
is equally applicable to situations where the parties settle for an amount which exceeds
basic economic loss as when a jury delivers a verdict. Gov=Noa's B.i. JACxEr, L. 1978,
c.572, BuDGrr REPORT ON Buis, S.10275-B, at 3 (1978). Second, the specific result, ex-
pressly stated by the Senate, is that the net recovery for pain and suffering will be in-
creased ($28,000 instead of $6,500) so that the total recovery will be increased ($54,000
versus $32,500). Id.
In addition, in a letter from the New York State Insurance Department to the Governor,
it was observed that "[p]ermitting a workers' compensation or disability benefits provider's
lien to remain applicable to pain and suffering recoveries pursuant to [the no-fault statute)
results in a double offset and leaves Granger and others, less than whole." Id. The legisla-
ture did not continue to permit liens to be attached to third-party tort recoveries for pay-
ments made in lieu of first-party benefits. See N.Y. Woax. Coup. LAW § 29(1-a) (McKinney
1965 & Supp. 1990). See also supra note 73 (explaining limitations on § 29(l) liens under
WCL).
" See supra note 73-74 (explaining that additional costs to workers' compensation carri-
ers would be result of § 29(1-a) limitation on liens).
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ous facial disfigurement were in lieu of first-party benefits, the
WCL is a remedial statute and, therefore, should be construed lib-
erally so as to best protect the injured party. 83 A liberal interpre-
tation of section 29(1-a) would consider payments for permanent
partial disability and serious facial disfigurement to be first-party
benefits, and would only permit the lien when payments for those
injuries exceed the statutory limit for first-party benefits." This
interpretation would make injured employees whole since they
rv m;ntc fg--, - hec. ; CnnnmI lnnseq due to nerma-
nent partial disability and serious facial disfigurement from work-
ers' compensation and no-fault, and economic and non-economic
losses for such injuries in the form of recoveries from third-party
tort actions.6 5 It is submitted that, without such a liberal interpre-
tation, workers' compensation carriers would be able to recoup
payments made for first-party benefits out of recoveries for pain
and suffering, thus defeating the legislature's intent to fully com-
pensate the injured party.
" See Wood v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 123 Misc. 2d 812, 813-14, 475 N.Y.S.2d
735, 737 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga County 1984) (advocating liberal interpretation of WCL § 29
favoring employee). See also Heitz v. Ruppert, 218 N.Y. 148, 154, 112 N.E. 750, 752
(1916) (law under employers' liability act "should be construed fairly.... liberally, in favor
of employee"); lllaqua v. Barr-Llewellyn Buick Co., Inc., 81 App. Div. 2d 708, 439
N.Y.S.2d 473, 474 (3d Dep't 1981) (fundamental principle of WCL § 29 is protection of
worker, not employer, so it should be construed liberally to favor employee); Appellant's
Brief, supra note 5, at 11 (WCL is beneficial and remedial in character and should be inter-
preted liberally in order tb accomplish its humanitarian goals); J.V. NACKLEY, PRIMER ON
WoRucis' CoMPENSATiON 8 (2d ed. 1989) (workers' compensation is remedial in character
and should be liberally construed in favor of beneficiary).
" N.Y. INs. LAW § 5102(bX2) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990). Most courts have asserted
that the lien should not be vacated totally within the context of no-fault, but instead should
be limited to those benefits which exceed the limit of first-party benefits. See, e.g., Fellner v.
Country Wide Ins., 95 App. Div. 2d 106, 109-10, 466 N.Y.S.2d 766, 769 (3d Dep't 1983)
(limitation in WCL § 29(1-a) not applicable after carrier pays $50,000); Vinson v.
Berkowitz, 83 App. Div. 2d 531, 533, 441 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462 (1st Dep't 1981) ("[b]ut once
the ceiling of $50,000, in basic economic loss is reached, the compensation carrier has a
right to offset any further benefits due against a recovery from a tort-feasor, especially
since that recovery would not include basic economic loss"); Cederman v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 58 App. Div. 2d 969, 970, 397 N.Y.S.2d 252, 253 (4th Dep't 1977) (with regards to
no-fault law, § 29(1) should be limited); Scott v. Orange County Dept. of Health, 89 Misc.
2d 853, 856, 393 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (Sup. Ct., Orange County 1977) (once workers' com-
pensation payments exceed $50,000, lien "may attach to proceeds of any settlement for
damages for injuries received by recipient of compensation benefits to extent of such
excess").
" Dietrick v. Kemper Ins. Co., 76 N.Y.2d 248, 252-54, 566 N.E.2d 1108, 1110-12, 557
N.Y.S.2d 301, 303-05 (1990).
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B. Constitutionality of the Workers' Compensation Law
Even before the enactment of no-fault, many workers' compen-
sation carriers argued that the WCL provisions dealing with per-
manent partial disability and serious facial disfigurement provided
benefits "wholly independent of claimant's inability to work""
and were, therefore, unconstitutional.8 7 Notwithstanding this con-
tention, both the United States Supreme Court and the New York
Court of Appeals have held that the WCL is constitutional be-
cause payments for permanent partial disability and serious facial
disfigurement actually are related to loss of earnings." Not only
may serious facial disfigurements or permanent partial disability
render the victim unable to perform his trade, but it is likely that
it may have a detrimental effect on the victim's ability to obtain or
maintain her status at any job due to the repulsive nature of the
disfigurement or the lingering effect of the disability." Therefore,
0 New York Cent. R.R. v. Bianc, 250 U.S. 596, 597 (1919).
1 See id. at 600-01; Sweeting v. American Knife Co., 226 N.Y. 199, 199-200, 123 N.E.
82, 83 (1919).
In New York CmL RR. v. Biane, the plaintiffs' contention was that the WCL provisions
granting compensation awards for permanent partial disability and serious facial or head
disfigurement were violative of the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution for
taking property without due process of law. Biase, 250 U.S. at 600-01.
In Suwteing v. Anerican Knife Co., workers' compensation carriers and employers argued
that an award for disfigurement constituted damages, not compensation for loss of earning
power, therefore the employer was being deprived, without fault, of property rights with-
out due process of law. Sweefing, 226 N.Y. at 199-200. 123 N.E. at 83.
0 See Biane, 250 U.S. at 601; Sweeting, 226 N.Y. at 201-03, 123 N.E. at 83. The United
States Supreme Court in Biane determined that a serious disfigurement of the face or head
may very well have a direct relationship to the victims ability to regain his earning power.
See Bias, 250 U.S. at 601.
The New York Court of Appeals in Sweating presumed that the legislature found serious
disfigurement was related to loss of earnings. Sueating, 226 N.Y. at 201, 123 N.E. at 83.
Judge Cardozo, writing for the majority, concluded that "one of the truths of life is that
serious facial disfigurement has a tendency to impair the earning power of its victims," and
continued by maintaining that in most situations the victim would be put at a disadvantage
when placed in competition with others. Id. Additionally, there is a presumption that the
Workers' Compensation Board has weighed all relevant circumstances in its assessment, so
there is no need for a jury trial to determine what is "fair and equitable." Id. at 202, 123
N.E. at 83. Furthermore, even though awards for permanent partial disability and serious
facial disfigurement are difficult to determine, the Act is not invalid because the commis-
sion has some discretion. Id. at 203, 123 N.E. at 83. See also supra notes 40, and 55-57 and
accompanying text (explaining relationship between loss of earnings and disfigurement).
See Smeting, 226 N.Y. at 204, 123 N.E. at 84. Judge Pound concurred in the major-
ity's holding that workers' compensation awards for serious head or facial disfigurement
are related to loss of earnings, but noted that it is not so much due to the victim's inability
to work, as to her inability to get work. Id. Judge Pound maintained that "[e]mployers
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awards for such injuries are based upon the impairment of earn-
ing capacity and should be deemed equivalent to first-party
benefits.90
C. Impermissibility of Concurrent Awards
Workers' compensation awards for permanent total disability 1
unquestionably have been deemed to be equivalent to lost
wages.9" Consequently, the fact that the WCL will not permit a
worker who has been classified as permanently totally disabled to
might refuse to employ a disfigured man in his trade either from lack of confidence in his
unimpaired ability or because it would be unpleasant for others to work beside him or
unprofitable to have him meet the customers." Id. See also lacone v. Cardillo, 208 F.2d
696, 699 (2d Cir. 1953) (WCL provides for facial or head disfigurement and is based upon
loss of earnings capacity because employer will hesitate to employ disfigured worker and
fellow employees will object to worker's presence due to worker's appearance).
* See J. WoRRAU., SAFETY AND THE WORK PLACE, 18-21 (1983). In discussing the contro-
versial nature of permanent partial disability payments throughout the United States, it
was explained that due to the injured employee's inability to work or gain work, she suffers
from either a loss of earning capacity or an actual loss of earnings. Id. It was reiterated,
however, that in essence those two aspects of work disability accompany each other; a loss
of earnings is created from a loss of earning capacity, and vice versa. Id. See id. at 22
(graphical depiction of loss of actual earnings sustained by permanently disabled workers).
Even though in New York State it has been established that earning capacity does not
have to be impaired before an award for facial disfigurement or permanent partial disabil-
ity can be allocated, it has still been held that such disabilities do, on average, impair earn-
ing capacity. See, e.g., Leone v. Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers Int'l Union No. 83, 59
App. Div. 2d 812, 812, 398 N.Y.S.2d 917, 918 (3d Dep't 1977) (workers' compensation
board does not have to establish earning capacity has been impaired in order to give award
for facial disfigurement); Farley v. Martin Mechanical Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 285, 287,
297 N.Y.S.2d 359, 361 (3d Dep't 1969) (claimant for workers' compensation benefits does
not have to wait until he cannot perform trade and suffers loss of earnings in order to
recover compensation for permanent partial disability), affd, 26 N.Y.2d 635, 255 N.E.2d
726, 307 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1970); Florick v. Broad Window Cleaning Co., 243 N.Y. 576, 576,
154 N.E. 611, 611 (1926) (award for facial disfigurement can be made even though earn-
ing capacity has been unimpaired).
11 See N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAw Section 15(1) (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1990). Section
15(1) states that in the case of permanent total disability, sixty-six and two-thirds per cen-
tum of the average weekly wages shall be paid to the employee during the continuance of
such total disability. Id.
" See Dietrick v. Kemper Ins. Co., 145 App. Div. 2d 8, 11, 537 N.Y.S.2d 372, 374 (4th
Dep't 1989). See also THE RE.PORT OF THE NATONAL COMMSSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAws 63 (1972) (permanent total disability benefits should be paid to work-
ers when injury prohibits substantial gainful activity for extended period of time); STATE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws: A COMPARISON OF MAJOR PROvIsIONs wrr, RECOMMENDED
STANDARDS 30 (1965) (when worker is determined permanently and totally disabled, disa-
bility will last for rest of life); Dachs & Dachs, A Call for Legislative Action, N.Y.L.J., Aug.
14, 1990, at 3, col 3 (workers' compensation payments for permanent disability are readily
identifiable as first-party benefits).
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receive a concurrent award for permanent partial disability or se-
rious facial disfigurement" supports the court of appeal's conclu-
sion that "the same theory and relationship between compensa-
tion and loss of earnings or earning capacity underlie all types of
workers' compensation awards."" An award for permanent total
disability is the broadest extent of recovery; it compensates an in-
jured employee for his lost wages, and covers all other disabili-
ties. 6 It has been consistently held that if an injured employee
were to receive concurrent awards, he would be receiving an over-
lap of economic losses." The purpose, therefore, of permanent
partial disability and serious facial disfigurement payments, as with
payments for permanent total disability, is to compensate an em-
ployee for present and future loss of earning capacity.91 It is sub-
" See N.Y. WORK. CoMP. LAW § 15(8) (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1990). This provision of
the WCL allows payments for permanent total disability to be given to one who has previ-
ously suffered from permanent partial disability, only after the cessation of the payments
for permanent partial disability. See id. at § 15(8Xc). Additionally, if an employee suffering
from a permanent physical impairment incurs a subsequent disability caused by both condi-
tions combined, and the compensation is now greater than if the subsequent injury oc-
curred alone, the workers' compensation carrier shall pay the higher amount, but be reim-
bursed for the previously paid lower amount. See id. at § 15(8Xd).
" Dietrick v. Kemper Ins. Co., 76 N.Y.2d 248, 254, 556 N.E.2d 1108, 1111, 557
N.Y.S.2d 301, 304 (1990). See infra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing WCL pay-
ments' relation to lost earnings).
" See Wilkosz v. Symington Gould Corp., 14 App. Div. 2d 408, 410, 221 N.Y.S.2d 209,
211 (3d Dep't 1961). See also Fredenburg v. Empire United Ry., 168 App. Div. 618, 622-
23, 154 N.Y.S. 351, 354 (3d Dep't 1915). In Fredenburg, the court stated that the WCL
provides a single maximum rate of compensation for total disability applicable to all disabil-
ities whether total or partial. Id. If concurring awards were permitted, an unjust result
would burden the employer and defeat the beneficial nature of the statute. Id.
" See, e.g., Gallman v. Walt's Tree Serv. Inc., 43 App. Div. 2d 419, 420, 352 N.Y.S.2d
516, 517 (3d Dep't 1974) (whole theory of WCL is to compensate injured employee for lost
wages, therefore concurrent payments would result in double compensation and contradict
purpose of WCL); Kaminski v. Mohawk Carpet Mills, 11 App. Div. 2d 827, 827, 202
N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (3d Dep't 1960) (award for facial disfigurement cannot be made to one
permanently totally disabled; same is true for one temporarily totally disabled); Beekman v.
New York Evening Journal, 258 App. Div. 833, 833, 15 N.Y.S.2d 671, 672 (3d Dep't
1939) (where compensation award was made for permanent total disability, additional
awards for loss or disability was not permissible); Clark v. Hayes, 207 App. Div. 560, 564,
202 N.Y.S. 453, 455 (3d Dep't) (in light of both case law and statutory construction, it
would be contrary to general policy of WCL to permit overlapping awards), a'd, 238 N.Y.
553, 144 N.E. 888 (1924).
" See Wilkosz, 14 App. Div. 2d at 410, 221 N.Y.S.2d at 211. In Wilkasz, the court
maintained:
(I]n this State and in the Federal courts, it has been consistently held that the pur-
pose of a schedule award is to compensate the employee for immediate or prospec-
tive loss of earnings or earning capacity .... In facial disfigurement cases ... the
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mitted that the legislature never intended to classify awards for
permanent partial disability and serious facial disfigurement as
non-economic in nature. If the legislature had intended payments
for permanent partial disability and serious facial disfigurement to
compensate for non-economic losses, then an injured worker
would be able to recover concurrent awards for permanent total
disability as well as for permanent partial disability and/or serious
facial disfigurement."
II. EQUATING Loss OF EARNINGS UNDER NO-FAULT AND THE WCL
A. Lost Earnings - Actual and Presumed
It is submitted that the implicit issue which divided the Dietrick
court revolved around how to correlate the classification of pay-
ments allowed under the WCL with payments made for lost earn-
ings allowed under no-fault." Under no-fault, an individual is
same theory and the relationship between any kind of compensation and loss of
earnings or earning capacity, has been recognized.
Id. See also lacone v. Cardillo, 208 F.2d 696, 700 (2d Cir. 1953) (compensation law is held
together by applying schedule awards in terms of wage-earning capacity); Marhoffer v.
Marhoffer, 220 N.Y. 543, 548, 116 N.E. 379, 380 (1917) (earning power decreases with
any type of loss of physical function); Jensen v. Southern Pac. Co., 215 N.Y. 514, 524, 109
N.E. 600, 603 (1915) (WCL allows compensation for loss of earning capacity only); Grello
v. Daszykowski, 58 App. Div. 2d 412, 417 n.4, 397 N.Y.S.2d 396, 400 n.4 (2d Dep't 1977)
(payments on basis of partial loss of body part or facial disfigurement are to compensate for
loss of earnings), rev'd on other grounds, 44 N.Y.2d 894, 379 N.E.2d 161, 467 N.Y.S.2d 133
(1978); Appellant's Brief, supra note 4, at 10 (awards for permanent partial disability have
been consistently held equivalent to loss of earning capacity). See generally J.V. NACKLEY,
PRIMZR ON WoRKERS' COMPENSA-ION 48 (1989) (purpose of permanent partial and perma-
nent total disability payments is to compensate injured party for prospective loss, even
though loss is measured by amount of wages worker was earning when injury occurred);
Workers' Compensation Board Guide for Evaluating Disability, Appendix G (unpublished
manuscript) ("schedule awards are not meant to be payment of damages, but are compen-
sation for impairment to perform gainful work").
" See Wilkosz, 14 App. Div. 2d at 410, 221 N.Y.S.2d at 211. Recognizing the legislative
intent of § 15 of the WCL, Judge Coon maintained that "'[t]here is nothing in section 15 of
the Workmens' Compensation Law which would be construed as expressly authorizing a
concurrent total and partial disability." Id. See N.Y. WoRK. CoMP. LAw § 15(8) (McKinney
1965 & Supp. 1990). The legislative intent, as illustrated in WCL § 15(8), with respect to
payments for permanent total or permanent partial disability, was declared to be compen-
sation to enable the injured party to support himself; there was never any mention of an
allotment of damages in order to allay the victim for his pain and suffering. See id.; Croce v.
Ford Motor Co., 282 App. Div. 2d 290, 291-92, 123 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (3d Dep't 1953),
rev'd on other grounds, 307 N.Y. 125, 120 N.E.2d 527 (1954).
- See Dietrick v. Kemper Ins. Co., 76 N.Y.2d 248, 253-54, 556 N.E.2d 1108, 1111-12,
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compensated for actual lost earnings'"0 calculated from the date
of the accident to a maximum period of three years. 01 Under the
WCL, an individual is compensated for lost earnings or earnings
capacity,102 whether actual or presumed."0 ' WCL payments, there-
fore, may represent replacement of earnings over the remaining
lifetime of the injured workers.' " It is submitted that one of the
real differences between lost earnings under no-fault and lost
earnings or earnings capacity under the WCL is the time period
which these benefits represent. Given the greater time period
over which workers' compensation payments may compensate in-
jured workers, it becomes difficult to neatly equate the concept of
lost earnings under both no-fault and the WCL.
Another difficulty involves the two statutes' differing ap-
proaches to the compensation of lost earnings. The WCL
presumes lost earnings, whereas no-fault requires actual lost earn-
ings. 105 The greatest tension over lost earnings between no-fault
557 N.Y.S.2d 301, 303-04 (1990).
I" See N.Y. INS. LAw § 5102 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990). See aLso State Farm Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 78 App. Div. 2d 456, 458-59, 435 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421-22 (4th Dep't
1981) (purpose of § 672 [now § 51021 is payment of actual lost earnings); Hughes v. Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Misc. 2d 667, 671, 414 N.Y.S.2d 493, 496-97 (Sup. Ct. Living.
ston County 1979) ("it is apparent that only wages actually paid, or payable in the future..
are contemplated or compensated as no-fault benefits").
See Grello v. Daszykowski, 58 App. Div. 2d 412, 416-17 n.4, 397 N.Y.S.2d 396, 397
n.4 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 44 N.Y.2d 894, 379 N.E.2d 161, 407 N.Y.S.2d 633
(1978). The appellate division stated:
Although it appears that plaintiff received scheduled loss compensation on the ba-
sis of a partial loss of use of his legs and right hand, and a lump-sum settlement on
the basis of facial disfigurement, it has been consistently held that the purpose of a
schedule award is to compensate the employee for immediate or prospective loss of
earnings or earning capacity. In facial disfigurement cases the same theory and the
relationship between any kind of compensation and loss of earnings or earnings ca-
pacity, has been recognized.
Id. (citations omitted).
I" See supra notes 40, 54-57, and 88-90 (explaining that all workers' compensation bene-
fits are to compensate for lost earnings or earnings capacity).
I" Id. See Sweeting v. American Knife Co., 226 N.Y. 199, 201, 123 N.E. 82, 83 (1919).
Judge Cardozo observed that "tl]awmakers framing legislation must deal with general ten-
dencies. The average and not the exceptional case determines the fitness of the remedy."
Id. See generally Marhoffer v. Marhoffer, 220 N.Y. 543, 547-48, 116 N.E. 379, 380 (1917)
(injuries like serious facial disfigurement may not necessarily impair earning power for any
fixed period, but that statute still refers to this type of disability as impairment to earning
capacity and compensation for loss of earnings or earnings capacity).
1" See generally supra notes 91 and 92 (injured workers may receive compensation over
lifetime).
I" Compare N.Y. WoaK Comp. LAw § 15 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1990) with N.Y. INs.
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and the WCL arises when the injured employee experiences no
actual lost earnings within the three year time limit under no-
fault, but experiences a potential for a loss of future earning ca-
pacity beyond three years. As previously noted, sections 29(1) and
29(1-a) were enacted to make workers' compensation carriers,
rather than no-fault carriers, primarily responsible for the pay-
ment of first-party benefits. 1" It is submitted, therefore, that it
was also the legislature's intent to construe lost earnings according
to the WCL definition rather than according to the narrower con-
cept of actual lost income under no-fault. The court's ruling in
Dietrick, equating workers' compensation awards for serious facial
disfigurement and permanent partial disability with first-party
benefits, effectively recognizes the legislative intent to expand the
definition of first-party benefits, in cases involving work related
automobile accidents, to include lost earnings, whether actual or
presumed. Therefore, the court's holding was appropriate be-
cause such injuries generally affect an injured party's future earn-
ing capacity rather than just her actual lost earnings.
B. The Windfall Issue
The appellate division in Dietrick reasoned that payments for
permanent partial disability and serious facial disfigurement which
"are for periods which may extend far beyond the actual lost time
from work"101 are more akin to pain and suffering than to first-
party benefits.'" Therefore, the fourth department viewed the si-
multaneous award for pain and suffering, serious facial disfigure-
ment and permanent partial disability as a double recovery.'"
The court relied on several cases which supported the view that
this simultaneous award had the appearance of being compensa-
tion for pain and suffering.1 " Such an appearance was implicitly
caused by the fact that the workers' compensation board has dis-
LAw § 5102 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990).
I" See supra notes 73, 74, 78 and 80 (statutory scheme of no-fault and workers' compen-
sation makes workers' compensation carriers primarily liable for first-party benefits).
Diatrck, 145 App. Div. 2d at 8, 11, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 372, 374.
1 Id.
I d.
I' d.
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cretion in determining awards for such payments and that these
payments 1 may extend beyond the lost time from work.11 2 It is
submitted, however, that this mere appearance does not suffi-
ciently rebut the well established argument that such payments
will ultimately compensate for lost earnings or earnings capacity
at some time during an injured worker's life.
The New York Court of Appeals responded to the appellate di-
vision's reservations concerning the potential creation of a "wind-
fall." ' The majority maintained that no windfall would occur be-
cause awards for permanent partial disability and serious facial
disfigurement fall within the definition of basic economic loss and
a victim is unable to recover for such losses in a direct action
under no-fault.114 It is suggested that the court should not be un-
derstood to mean that economic and non-economic losses arising
from such injuries cannot be recovered in a third-party tort ac-
tion.116 Instead, it is submitted that the court is only precluding an
injured worker's recovery for basic economic losses stemming
from serious facial disfigurement and permanent partial disability.
Thus, any third-party recoveries for economic losses and/or pain
and suffering arising from such injuries are an addition, and not a
preclusion to recoveries under workers' compensation.
'll See N.Y. WoRK. Comp. LAw § 20 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1990) ("board shall have
full power and authority to determine all questions in relation to the payment of claims").
"' Dietrick, 145 App. Div. at 1 1, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 374. It should be noted, however, that
the dissent cites no statistics on what percentage of awards for serious facial disfigurement
and permanent partial disability represent payments which go substantially beyond the ac-
tual time lost from work, especially in work related automobile accidents. Dietrick v. Kem-
per, 76 N.Y.2d 248, 254, 55, 556 N.E.2d 1108, 1112, 550 N.Y.S.2d 304, 305 (1990). In
addition, it appears the dissent loses sight of the fact that the legislature authorizes such
awards simply because, on average, loss of earnings or earnings capacity will be the proba-
ble consequence when a worker sustains these types of injuries. See also supra notes 91 and
92 (permanently injured workers suffer loss of earnings throughout lifetime).
Il" Dietrick, 76 N.Y.2d at 254, 556 N.E.2d at I 11, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
114 See id. at 254, 556 N.E.2d at 1110, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 304-05 (1990).
11' See N.Y. INS. LAW § 5104 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990). Section 5104(a) of the
Insurance Law expressly gives an injured driver the right to sue a third-party for non-
economic losses if the injury is "serious," a term that includes significant disfigurement. Id.
at § 5104(a). See aso Agnastakios v. Laureano, 85 Misc. 2d 203, 208, 379 N.Y.S.2d 664,
668 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1976) (primary purpose of no-fault is to afford rapid
payment of first-party benefits without regard to fault, not to unduly hamper potential
litigation for recovery of non-economic loss where unwarranted). See also Dachs & Dachs, A
Callfor Leolative Action, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 14, 1990, at 3, col 3 (legislature should address
issue of third-party recoveries for pain and suffering arising out of work-related automobile
accident resulting in serious facial disfigurement).
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The practical effect of the Dietrick ruling brings to light another
aspect of the windfall issue. As previously noted, the legislative
intent behind the enactment of the section 29(1) lien was to mini-
mize costs within the workers' compensation system. 116 As a result
of the lien, those injured in work related automobile accidents
were receiving less for pain and suffering in third-party actions
than those not injured in work related automobile accidents, as-
suming equivalent injuries.1 It is submitted that, with the enact-
ment of section 29(1-a) and the court's holding in Dietrick, workers
may now keep Lhe samte aiuuitni rccuvc, dcU l,-- a-par, C0.. .--
for pain and suffering as non-workers. It is also submitted that no
windfall results if the injured worker receives more than he would
have before the enactment of section 29(1-a) because the legisla-
ture intended to ensure that injured workers be made whole from
all sources and that they not become a burden to society. 1 This
extra compensation merely reflects the means used to accomplish
legitimate legislative goals and puts the compensation claimant on
an equal footing with the non-compensation claimant.
III. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Despite the propriety of the Dietrick court's holding that pay-
ments for serious facial disfigurement and permanent partial disa-
bility are in lieu of first-party benefits, there is still a need for leg-
islative action in order to fully clarify the interaction between no-
fault and the WCL. With the enactment of section 29(1-a), the
legislature specified that liens should not attach to third-party re-
coveries when workers' compensation payments are in lieu of first-
party benefits.11' It is proposed that the legislature should go be-
yond the limits of the section 29(1) lien already imposed by sec-
"' See supra note 54 (explaining legislative intent behind enactment of § 29(1)).
", See Granger v. Urda, 44 N.Y.2d 91, 99, 375 N.E.2d 380, 383, 404 N.Y.S.2d 319, 322
(1978). The "harsh, unintended result" obtained when the worker is involved in an auto
accident would not occur if the victim is not at work. See id.
"I See Wiggins v. Carter, 178 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 5, 1977, at 13, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1977). In Wiggins, the court stated that the sweeping language of § 29 had to be
restricted, otherwise a driver injured on the job would be prevented from achieving the
same award for out-of-pocket loss as an unemployed injured person in the same auto acci-
dent. Id. See also supra notes 18, 55, 73 and 80 (purpose behind WCL was to make injured
workers whole and prevent workers from becoming burden to society).
"I N.Y. WORK. CoMP. LAW § 29(1-a) (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1990).
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tion 29(1-a) and specify that workers' compensation liens should
only attach to that portion of third-party recoveries which consti-
tute economic losses.110 If the section 29(1) lien is allowed to at-
tach to the part of the third-party recovery which constitutes pain
and suffering, there would be a recurrence of a debit. The total
monies available to compensate the injured worker for all of her
losses would be reduced because benefits paid to compensate for
lost earnings would be recouped from recoveries for pain and suf-
fering. The proposal submitted would effectively eliminate the re-
duction of awards for pain and suffering and ensure that injured
workers receive full compensation for economic, basic economic
and non-economic losses. Compensation carriers, in turn, will still
be able to recoup monies previously paid for lost earnings and,
therefore, prevent workers from receiving double recoveries for
basic economic loss.
Such a proposal should not be difficult to administer in the case
where a jury awards a verdict in a third-party action. At trial, the
workers' compensation carrier can request that the jury be given a
special instruction to itemize the verdict as to what portion of the
recovery is for pain and suffering and what portion is for eco-
nomic loss. The difficulty arises, however, when there is a settle-
ment between the injured person and the third-party. Since most
tort cases are settled, this becomes an important issue.
Two proposals have been considered in order to deal with set-
tlement cases. First, there can be a requirement of a hearing to
determine whether the settlement represents economic losses,
non-economic losses or both."" At the hearing, if the settlement
of the third-party action is determined by a judge or other referee
to be solely in lieu of pain and suffering, the lien should not attach
" See N.Y. INS. LAW § 5102 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990).
See Wiggins v. Carter, 178 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 5, 1977, at 13, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1977). This case arose prior to the enactment of § 29(1-a), and dealt with an em-
ployee injured in a car accident during the course of employment. See id. The injured party
settled with the negligent third-party, and an issue arose involving the extent to which the
§ 29(1) lien should apply specifically when there is a third-party settlement. Id. The court
in Wiggins held that if any part of the settlement had been for lost wages and medical
expenses, thereby fitting into the definition of basic economic loss, the lien would attach,
but if the settlement was solely for pain and suffering, the lien should not attach. Id. at 13,
col. 2. In order to solve the ambiguity as to what the settlement constituted, the court
stated that a hearing on such question was required. Id.
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to the settlement. On the other hand, if the settlement is deter-
mined to represent both economic and non-economic losses, then
only that portion of the settlement deemed to be economic loss
should be subject to the section 29(1) lien. Second, for administra-
tive ease, the legislature could designate that no lien can attach to
the first $36,000 of a settlement, the maximum allowable amount
for lost earnings under no-fault. The underlying presumption
would be that this portion of a settlement is for pain and suffer-
ing. Thus, no hearing on the issue would be needed.
A 1thViich th;c rnmmont nnlv denit with the situation where em-
ployees were injured in automobile accidents during the course of
their employment, it is also proposed that the section 29(1) lien
should be similarly restricted in all cases where an injured worker
receives a third-party tort recovery. Such a restriction on the sec-
tion 29(1) lien would be consistent with the theory behind the
WCL that compensation benefits are equivalent to lost earnings,
and the legislature's intent to ensure that injured workers are
fully compensated for all losses. Thus, the same procedures used
in determining the economic loss component of third-party tort
recoveries in automobile related accidents could similarly be used
in other work related tort cases.
CONCLUSION
When the WCL was interacted with other statutory schemes,
confusion arose where the legislature was not clear as to how con-
flicting provisions should be integrated. In concluding that perma-
nent partial disability and serious facial disfigurement payments
are first-party benefits, the New York Court of Appeals applied
longstanding theories that workers' compensation payments are
economic in nature and that both permanent partial disability and
serious facial disfigurement have the capacity to decrease earning
power. The conclusion that workers' compensation payments for
such injuries were in lieu of first-party benefits merely grafted
these fundamental principles onto no-fault by expanding the defi-
nition of first-party benefits. Injured employees who receive pay-
ments for permanent partial disability and serious facial or head
disfigurement will be fully compensated for their first-party bene-
fits because workers' compensation carriers will no longer be able
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to assert liens on third-party tort recoveries to recoup such pay-
ments. Nonetheless, legislation should be initiated to require that
section 29(1) liens should never attach to third-party tort recov-
eries for non-economic losses arising out of any work related acci-
dents. The liens would only attach to that portion of third-party
tort recoveries comprising economic losses and, therefore, the
workers' compensation carriers will only recoup monies equivalent
in kind to workers' compensation payments.
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